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1. INTRODUCTION
Social reasoning, which we define as reasoning about the interactions between
agents in a multiagent system, is a central concern of multiagent systems research,
as the nature of such systems emphasises the aspect of interaction in collectives of
intelligent agents. Unsurprisingly, the range of methods applied to social reasoning is
therefore very broad, and includes (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009; Wooldridge,
2009):
• methods for offline design of interaction mechanisms based on a principled anal-
ysis of the interaction problem in hand (as in game-theoretic approaches, mecha-
nism design, and agent communication languages),
• methods that restrict the range of behaviours of agents to ensure certain global
system properties are maintained (as in plan coordination and teamwork-based
approaches, norms and social laws), and
• methods for online reasoning about other agents while interaction is unfolding (as
in adversarial search, planning and learning, opponent modelling, and trust and
reputation mechanisms).
Quite naturally, this means that different social reasoning approaches focus on differ-
ent techniques, e.g. logic-based specification and (manual or automated) verification
of formal properties, game-theoretic analysis, adaptation of algorithms from such
areas as search, planning, and machine learning to social reasoning problems, and
the design of novel, “bespoke” formalisms and algorithms.
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This has resulted in a great deal of fragmentation in the area, making different
methods from different areas hard to compare, combine, and reuse in a context differ-
ent from the original setting they were developed for. From an engineering point of
view, this limits the possibilities of using existing approaches for new multiagent
systems. Moreover, many of these areas do not provide a means for using their
theoretical models directly in the implementation of agent-based systems. Instead,
they restrict themselves to specifying and analysing properties of systems, and leave
the translation of these properties to actual implementations to the human expert.
In this paper, we present a framework for describing social reasoning mecha-
nisms in a uniform way which allows agents to reason about specifications of these
reasoning mechanisms at run-time. This framework, called the Expectation-Strategy-
Behaviour (ESB) framework, attempts to capture what we view as the “greatest
common denominator” between many existing methods:
(i) The ability to maintain a set of evolving beliefs about properties regarding the
“social state” of the system,
(ii) a facility to trigger behaviours based on the state of these beliefs and predictions
about their evolution, and
(iii) provisions to limit this analysis in a rational way depending on available compu-
tational resources.
ESB presents the opportunity to analyse, formalise, specify and implement social
reasoning methods on several levels. Firstly, as a conceptual tool that provides a
unifying method for looking at different types of social reasoners. Secondly, as a
formal specification language which allows designers to capture and analyse social
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reasoning mechanisms in a precise way. Thirdly, as a computational mechanism for
generating behaviour according to such specifications in implemented agents in a
modular, extensible, and reusable way.
This paper presents a combination and extension of different aspects of ESB that
have been presented before in Wallace and Rovatsos (2009, 2011). We tie together
the existing work presenting a more uniform formal presentation, expanding on the
general context of the work, provide further details of the implemented reasoning
system and present a more complex example on norm reasoning.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We start by discussing
desiderata for a general practical social reasoning system in Section 2. This is fol-
lowed by an introduction of the ESB framework at a conceptual level in Section 3.
We deliberately keep sections 2 and 3 informal, explaining the general ESB princi-
ples. Section 4 provides the formal definition of the ESB model. The ESB reasoning
engine implemented is described in Section 5, followed by an evaluation based on
several case studies in Section 6. Sections 7 and 8 close with an overview of related
work and concluding remarks.
2. DESIDERATA
The purpose of ESB is to aid the implementation of practical social reasoning
agents that can make inferences about the social state of affairs and act accordingly
at run-time. In other words, we emphasise the requirement of being able to use
a framework for social reasoning from the agent’s point of view in actual agent
programming, rather than only for the human expert to reason “externally” about
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specifications of social reasoning methods. We call it “practical” in this sense, as it
is directed toward action (as opposed to theoretical reasoning about a system). To
achieve this at a relatively generic level, it is necessary to provide:
• a template for social reasoning that fits the requirements of many existing social
reasoning methods,
• a description of the computational mechanism that is needed to process specifica-
tions of these methods in the suggested “meta-model”, and
• a means to adapt the amount of run-time social reasoning to the computational
resources that are available in a concrete system.
This is precisely what we set out to achieve with the research described in this paper:
To capture various different styles of social reasoning, we develop the abstract ESB
framework, a generic meta-model/template for concrete social reasoning methods.
To be a useful and flexible technique in agent development, we want to be able to
program ESB agents. We develop the formal model for the ESB framework with a
clear syntax and semantics, which is suitable for boundedly rational run-time pro-
cessing. This allows us to build an ESB interpreter, a reasoning engine for processing
ESB specifications. The interpreter can be integrated with a BDI interpreter to (i)
show how practical social reasoning and general practical reasoning interact and can
be meaningfully combined and (ii) to be able to present example implementations of
existing social reasoning methods for evaluation purposes.
In the development of ESB, we follow the example of BDI in many ways. Firstly,
just as the BDI architecture acts as a meta-model for general practical reasoning (i.e.
reasoning about goals and actions), ESB can be used as a conceptual template for
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social practical reasoning. Secondly, following the example of BDI logics, the for-
mal ESB framework allows us to construct formal specifications of concrete social
reasoning mechanisms and to verify those automatically. Thirdly, the ESB reasoning
engine allows these formal specifications to be used directly for agent implementa-
tion much in the same way as BDI-based programming languages provide similar
functionality.
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. High-level overview
Before moving on to a more detailed introduction of the framework, it is worth
describing the main ideas behind it along very general lines to provide some intuition
and to motivate our approach.
Generally speaking, multiagent systems involve distributed representations of
the global state of affairs, where the local views agents have of parts of this state are
modelled as beliefs. The intuition underlying the design of ESB is that any “hidden”
property of the system that concerns other agents and/or interactions with them that
cannot be observed directly could be viewed as a social belief. While there is no
precise definition of what a social belief is, the most common examples include the
mental states of other agents (their beliefs, intentions, preferences, capabilities etc.),
the execution state of a protocol-based or plan-based interaction, social laws, norms
and commitments, etc.
We define expectations as rules that govern how social beliefs are updated under
different circumstances based on different observations. Strategies are then “expec-
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tation expansion” functions that specify how an agent “maps out” the evolution
of expectations over time to make decisions, determining how the agent’s social
reasoning is bounded. Finally, we introduce behaviours as rules that determine how
social beliefs affect other beliefs or the agents’ actual behaviour in the system.
To develop a practical mechanism that can be used by agents at run-time, our
computational tools for ESB provide the following features:
• A specification language that can be used by the designer to specify the properties
of a social reasoning mechanism using expectations, strategies and behaviours.
• An algorithm that automatically generates a state transition model that behaves in
compliance with these properties. Adding this model to the agent’s specification
will ensure that the resulting agent design satisfies the properties of the social
reasoning mechanism in question.
• A method for verifying the guards of behavioural rules that specify how different
states of social beliefs impact on real behaviour, and to modify behaviour accord-
ing to those rules that fire in a given situation.
Put simply, the work described in this paper enables agent designers to specify an
update mechanism for social beliefs and rules for how different states of social belief
affect behaviour. Then, the generic ESB machinery allows such specifications to
be directly executed in an implementation. We introduce a simple example in the
following section that illustrates this further.
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3.2. A Simple Example
Consider the following very simple example of a trust mechanism in a mul-
tiagent system: Assume a reasoning agent maintains trust values for other agents
and updates them based on its own interaction experience and reports from other
agents. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a discrete range of trust “levels”
{++,+,0,−,−−} and use operators like < for comparisons between them.
The non-observable social belief here is the actual trustworthiness of another
agent A which we denote by tA, as estimated by the reasoning agent R. Here he
semantics of “trustworthiness” is only important as far as it affects R’s behaviour,
though how it is modelled may of course be based on some underlying theory of
trust.
In this trust mechanism, expectations can be used to describe update rules be-
tween different states of tA. For example, R may want his trust mechanism to satisfy
the following constraints:
E1 “When interacting with A for the first time, let tA = 0. If the interaction has a
positive outcome, increment tA, else decrement tA by two levels.”
E2 “If B is a witness with tB > 0 and B reports a negative experience with A,
decrement tA by one level.”
Even in this simple mechanism, we can observe a few simple properties that will
be discussed at a more general level later. Firstly, as the clauses suggest, social
beliefs are often contingent statements that depend on the context, i.e. they rely on
some condition. Secondly, as the belief they concern (trust) cannot be verified itself
through observation, an explicit test has to be specified, i.e. an observable event that
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triggers belief change (a positive/negative interaction experience, or B’s report in
the above example). Finally, to capture the belief change mechanism, a response
to different outcomes of a test has to be defined, that modifies some belief (here,
changes to the value of tA).
In isolation, these update rules, which we call expectations in our framework,
are of course not very useful for practical decision making. Rather, in a sensible
agent design, different states, or projections about future states of their values would
trigger behaviours, for example:
B1 “If tA < 0, don’t send A any sensitive information.”
B2 “If tA =−−, don’t interact with A.”
B3 “If tA = −− and tA cannot ever increase again, discard A as an interaction
partner.”
B4 “If tA > tB, prefer A over B.”
B5 “If tA > tB always in the future, discard B.”
Some of these rules refer only to the current situation, simply conditioning certain
behaviours on the belief state. More complex rules however depend on the evolution
of beliefs, effectively representing meta-reasoning that considers the dynamics of R’s
own belief update mechanism. B3 and B5 illustrate this. Given that the expectations
allow third party witness reports only to decrease trust values in the example, rule
B2 effectively means that once tA has dropped to −−, it will not increase again, as
that agent will not be interacted with. So one could apply rule B3 to stop considering
A as an interaction partner (“discard” them) and save time. Similarly, if rule B4 is
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applied, as tB won’t increase again, rule B5 will also become true – B can be safely
ignored.
This kind of meta-reasoning requires inference over the entire set of expecta-
tion rules, and, if temporal dynamics with cycles are present, can cause unbounded
reasoning complexity. To enable rational, bounded decision making and generate
responsive behaviour in real-world applications, one has to restrict the scope of
possible future changes to expectations. Example strategies of how to do this might
be the following:
S1 “Only consider trust value changes up to the next ten interactions or twenty
witness reports.”
S2 “Ignore positive interactions or positive witness reports when making predictions
about future trust values.”
S3 “Only make predictions about high-value interactions, ignoring low-value inter-
actions.”
These are just examples for how to limit the projection space, either by imposing
a depth limit (S1), taking a pessimistic “worst-case” point of view in evaluating
future developments (S2), or pruning the search space based on domain-dependent
criteria (S3). Effectively, they restrict the “horizon” over which temporal operators
like “never again” or “always in the future” will be evaluated, thus bounding the set
of future states that have to be considered in the guards of behaviour rules like B3 and
B5 above. Depending on the time and space available to an agent when making deci-
sions, different levels of reasoning accuracy are possible, and they reflect the amount
of effort that goes into social reasoning activities in actual agent implementations.
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At an informal level, this example suggests that ESB is appropriate for capturing
trust and reputation mechanisms. In Section 6, we will show that ESB achieves broad
coverage of existing social reasoning methods by presenting concrete case studies
where we apply it to reasoning about intentions in communication, reasoning about
norms, and opponent modelling in games.
3.3. Expectations, strategies, and behaviours
We now present a mostly informal overview of the ESB framework, which al-
ready uses some of the notation which will be formally introduced in Section 4 in
full detail. To begin with, we introduce our notion of expectation: An expectation
(Exp N A C Φ T ρ+ ρ−)
is a rule specifying the way in which A will update a belief regarding statement Φ.
The rule has identifier N, and specifies thatΦwould be believed only under condition
C. It also specifies how the expectation set might change after performing test T , by
specifying a response ρ+ if the test is successful (i.e. confirms the expectation), and
an alternative response ρ− if the test fails.
Going back to the examples on p.7, we could encode E1 as
(
Exp E1︸︷︷︸
N
R︸︷︷︸
A
first interaction(A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
trust(A,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
“positive interaction”︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
“replace E1 with E3”︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ+
“replace E1 with E4”︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ−
)
where the responses ρ replace the expectation with E3 and E4, which are similar
expectations with the appropriately adjusted trust values (one level up and two levels
lower, respectively). An expectation for E2 would be conditioned on another agent
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B being trusted, expect that B would make for an appropriate witness, and the tests
would involve B informing R of the untrustworthiness of A. The positive response
would be to replace E1 with an expectation corresponding to the respective lower
trust level. The negative response is void in this example, so nothing would be
required here. We deliberately only present one illustrative expectation here, rather
than the complete system, as this is a simple example to introduce the ideas. Further
details of expectations systems can be found throughout later sections of the paper.
Expectations allow us to express context-dependent rules for how to update so-
cial belief, and under which circumstances the update will have what consequences.
Thereby, we assume that the test T is something that can be observed in the environ-
ment, and the response ρ is a modification to the set of all expectations held by the
agent.
We should emphasise that introducing the notion of “expected belief” contained
in an expectation as something different from beliefs (in the ordinary sense of the
word) is important for several reasons. Methodologically, it allows us to single out
“social” beliefs from other beliefs used by the general (practical) reasoning mecha-
nism of the agent, so that any influence on non-social beliefs has to be made explicit
via some behaviour rule (as we shall see below). Also, it encourages the designer to
think about the context, triggering test and update rules associated with an expected
belief when mentioning it in an expectation. Computationally, as we describe below,
labelling beliefs as “expectation-related” serves as a mechanism for including them
in the model generation phase of the ESB reasoning engine.
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3.4. Reasoning about expectations
The overall ESB reasoning process is relatively easy to describe at a high level,
since an agent’s social reasoning state is simply defined by the agent’s active set of
expectations (defined formally below). Each processing cycle consists of two phases:
Expectation update Based on observed events and/or belief changes outside the
ESB reasoning mechanism (e.g. at BDI level), expectations in the active set are
made current (or not, according to their conditions), which leads to a new set of
expected beliefs – those directly used for behaviour generation.
Behaviour generation The guards of behaviour rules are verified against the model
of dynamic expectation changes derived from current expectations. Those be-
haviour rules that “fire” effect a change to the agent’s non-ESB reasoner. Usually
this will be a belief change, but in theory it could directly lead to physical action,
the adoption of some intention, etc.
For update, the agent looks at the active expectations that are currently present. For
those active expectations whose conditions C apply (called current expectations), the
presence of test condition (or event) T will trigger the response ρ+, if ¬T is believed
then the negative response ρ− is triggered.
As far as behaviour generation is concerned, it is easiest to imagine the reason-
ing model as a graph among possible sets of expectations whose edges represent
transitions caused by expectation updates (similar to state-transition models used in
temporal/dynamic logics). Behaviour rules of the format “if φ then ψ” will cause
the ESB engine to verify whether property φ holds in this state-transition model. If
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the verification of φ succeeds, the ESB engine will attempt to make ψ true, e.g. by
revising the agent’s (non-ESB) belief. A behaviour rule like
B5 “If tA > tB always in the future, discard B”,
for example, will traverse the expectation graph checking whether tB can ever exceed
tA in all future states. If this check fails, it will remove a fact that B is a potential
interaction partner from the agent’s belief base. If a strategy like
S2 “Ignore positive interactions or positive witness reports when making predictions
about future trust values.”
is used during this verification of tA > tB, only edges in the graph would be followed
that are caused by negative witness reports or negative interactions, i.e. the agent
would only take negative information into account.
It is important to highlight here that this reasoning cycle does not describe any
particular “style” of social reasoning, and this is intentional. By sticking to a general
structure which translates any set of rules that could describe an update mechanism
for social beliefs into a model within which arbitrary behaviour-triggering properties
can be proven, ESB provides a framework for social reasoning that is as generic as
possible, within the limitations of a propositional formalism. Moreover, the notion
of strategies allows any potential limitation on reasoning resources to be taken into
account in a concrete ESB implementation.
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4. FORMAL FRAMEWORK
4.1. Expectations
To define the syntax of expectations, assume a set of agent namesA = {A,A′, . . .},
a set of expectation names N = {N,N′, . . .}, and a propositional logical language
L (with atoms {p,q, . . .}, constants> and⊥, and the usual connectives). An expec-
tation is a structure
(Exp N A C Φ T ρ+ ρ−)
where N ∈N , A ∈A , C ∈L , φ ∈L , T ∈L and ρ+,ρ− ∈℘(N )×℘(N ). The
intended meaning of such an expectation held by agent A is as follows:
“If N is an active expectation, whenever condition C holds, adopt belief Φ. When verification of T occurs,
respond according to ρ+ if T is true, and according to ρ− otherwise.”
Essentially, this means that expectations are event-condition-action rules, with the
only difference that the actions taken refer to the rulebase itself: although the agent
could “respond” in many different ways in theory, in ESB this is restricted to acti-
vating and deactivating other (or the same) expectation(s). To express this, we define
ρ = (A,D) for both responses ρ ∈ {ρ+,ρ−}, such that add(ρ) = A/del(ρ) = D are
the sets of expectations that are added to/removed from the set of active expectations
after update.
To keep the framework for reasoning about expectations simple, we deliber-
ately do not introduce a novel logic of expectations. Instead, we use expectations
as atomic rules that affect non-social beliefs, and resort to a BDI logic for capturing
the semantics of expectations. Specifically, we use LORA (Wooldridge, 2000), a
multi-modal propositional BDI logic which combines modalities for belief, desire
A FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTICAL SOCIAL REASONING 15
and intention with aspects of dynamic logic and CTL temporal logic (note that in the
concrete implementation presented below, we introduce additional “syntactic sugar”
to allow first-order-like specifications of finite sets of expectations using variables,
see Section 5.2). Additionally, to represent dynamically changing expectation sets,
we introduce special propositions {αE |E ⊆fin N } that are distinct from all other
atoms in L and are used to reify what subset of all possible expectations is active.
We take these to be finite subsets of N and to be mutually exclusive, such that αE
is only true for the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) set of active expectations
at any given point in time. This allows us to introduce expectation syntax simply as
shorthand notation forLORA formulas in the following way:
Assume agent A is reasoning about a set of (potential) expectations EXP =
{e1, . . . ,em}, where ei = (Exp Ni A Ci Φi Ti ρ+i ρ−i ) 1 6 i 6 m. The semantics of
this set EXP is defined by rewriting it as a set ofLORA statements:
αE ⇔
∧
i∈{1,...,m}
A(currenti W updatei)
where
current =(Bel A Ci)⇒ (Bel A Φi)
update =
(
(Bel A Ti)∧A©αEXP\del(ρ+i )∪add(ρ+i )
)
∨(
(Bel A ¬Ti)∧A©αEXP\del(ρ−i )∪add(ρ−i )
)
This reformulation of expectation sets in LORA requires some explanation. To
start with, we should describe some of the more complex LORA notation used:
© ϕ ( ϕ) means ϕ will be true in the next state (in all future states) along a
temporal path; ϕ W ψ is a weak “until” operator, denoting that until ψ becomes true
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(which might never happen), ϕ will hold true; A ϕ is universal path quantification
used for the branching-time side of LORA , denoting that ϕ will be true on all
paths from the current state; finally, (Bel A ϕ) is a normal KD45 belief modality for
agent A.
Given this, each of the rules defines when exactly each αE holds true, i.e. when
the agent has set E as its current set of active expectations. This is defined as a
conjunction over all e ∈ E, where the formula for each e corresponds to
“belief in the condition C(e) will lead to adopting the expected belief Φ(e) (“current”) until (“update”) the
agent either comes to believe T (e) and modifies e according to ρ+, disbelieves C(e), or comes to believe ¬T (e)
and modifies E according to ρ−.”
We use the notation X(e) to refer to component X of expectation e in a set of
expectations (e.g. C(e) refers to the condition of e, etc).
What is referred to as “modification” of the set of active expectations here is what
necessitates introduction of the αE propositions, as we have to be able to express a
dynamic relationship between different such sets. The LORA -level definition of
expectation sets effectively means that these create a number of logical constraints
on the belief dynamics of the agent at the meta-level, using BDI-level belief as an
“object language”. This has several implications: On the positive side, it allows us
to seamlessly integrate ESB specifications with the BDI-level reasoner, and to avoid
introduction of yet another logical language and proof theory. On the negative side,
we cannot reason compositionally about the contents of C(e), Φ(e) and T (e) across
different expectations, as capturing the dynamics of how sets of expectations are
updated requires the reification performed above, at least to be able to do efficient,
resource-bounded reasoning over them. Below, we will return to the issue of expo-
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nential blowup in specification length that results from the power set construction
over expectations above.
To summarise, this defines a relatively straightforward (though restricted) way
for managing expectations. In what follows, for convenience we will often write
EXPA for the set of active expectations, i.e. the subset of expectations for which
αE is true, and EXPC for current expectations e ∈ EXPA for which C(e) is true i.e.
active expectations for which the agent will adopt the expected belief Φ(e) (obvi-
ously, EXPC ⊆ EXPA ⊆ EXP). Note that, in our examples below, the annotation of
expectations with the identifier of the agent who holds them is not needed. However
we maintain it in the expectation notation throughout the paper as it is necessary
to maintain the mapping to the LORA semantics, which require beliefs to be
ascribed to the agent that holds the respective expectation.
4.2. Strategies
As explained above informally, strategies are used to bound reasoning over ex-
pectations by constraining the way in which future expectation updates are consid-
ered. To define them formally, it is easiest to think of the different potential values
of EXPA as nodes in an expectation graph, and of the connections between different
such sets that are triggered by the expectations contained in EXPA as edges among
them. Then, a strategy simply becomes a restriction on the paths considered in this
graph when verifying a given behaviour.
More formally, let G = (V ,E ) an expectation graph, where V =℘(EXP). To
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define the set of edges E ⊆ V ×V , we first introduce the notation
update(E,E+,E−) := E ∪ ( ⋃
e∈E+
add(ρ+(e))
)\( ⋃
e∈E+
del(ρ+(e))
)
∪ ( ⋃
e∈E−
add(ρ−(e))
)\( ⋃
e∈E−
del(ρ−(e))
)
where
E+ = {e|e ∈ EXPA,(Bel A T (e))}
E− = {e|e ∈ EXPA,(Bel A ¬T (e))}
This allows us to determine the set of active expectations update(E,E+,E−) that
results from applications of the responses of an arbitrary combination of updates
following from positive test outcomes for some expectations E+ and negative out-
comes for the tests of expectations E−. That is, update(E,E+,E−) is one potential
successor state of E brought about by one particular combination of test outcomes.
With this, we can define the edges of the expectation graph as
E =
{
(E,E ′) | E ′ = update(E,E+,E−),E+∪E− ⊆ E,E+∩E− = /0
}
This means that all pairs of active expectation sets (E,E ′) will be connected if E ′ is a
potential successor state of E for some active expectation tests succeeding and others
failing. Note that this does not require a complete specification of all test outcomes
in E; due to the condition E+∪E− ⊆ E all transitions are included for any subset of
tests T (e) for e ∈ E. This enables us to track transitions when only some outcomes
of T (e) become known.
With this structure in mind, a strategy is a way to restrict this graph in some
way, either according to some particular style of reasoning (e.g. “optimistic”, i.e.
only considering positive test outcomes), or so as to respect limitations regarding
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reasoning resources (e.g. restricted to some depth limit regarding future expectation
states). This is useful as behaviours rely on checking conditions on the accessible
portion of the graph as we shall see below.
A strategy STR⊆ E ∗ is therefore formally just a subset of the paths that can be
generated from E . How the set of paths considered following a particular strategy
is restricted is deliberately not specified. This is a concern for specific ESB imple-
mentations, but could be in terms of forbidden states, sequences of states, transitions
etc. In principle any graph operation could be used that restricts the set of paths
considered.
It should be remarked that this graph-theoretic description of the expectation
update system is closely related to the constructions of the previous section, in
particular to the reification of expectations as atomic objects which allows us to
reason about their dynamics without being concerned with their content. As shown
in the following section, behaviours bring the two layers together again and explain
how meta-level reasoning about expectations affects actual agent belief.
4.3. Behaviours
Conceptually, behaviours in ESB are rules that express how the agent’s overall
reasoning and actions are affected by its social reasoning. These rules depend on the
system of expectations an agent holds, which reflect the agent’s reasoning dynamics
about social “facts”. In our formal framework, more specifically, behaviours are
condition-action rules mapping conditions on the expectations to actions external
to the social reasoner, where actions take the form of adding or removing beliefs to
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influence (say) a BDI practical reasoner (e.g. by restricting the set of plans from the
plan library that can currently be used).
The set of expectations does not only describe the current social reasoning state,
as represented by active expectations, but also possible future belief states. These
belief dynamics are encoded in the expectation graph structure and behaviours may
include conditions such as “Φ will always be expected” and “it is possible to expect
Φ” in the future.
To enable this, we assume that the preconditions of behaviour rules ϕ are ex-
pressed in CTL (Gabbay et al., 2000) using the usual syntax
ϕ ::=> | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ → ϕ |
A©ϕ | E©ϕ | A  ϕ | E  ϕ | A [ϕ U ϕ] | E [ϕ U ϕ]
where p is an atom inL , Eϕ denotes existential path quantification, and ϕ U ψ is
a “strong” until operator (which requires that ψ eventually become true). We write
ϕ ∈LCTL for formulae that are in this superset ofL (and subset ofLORA ).
As regards postconditions, as stated above, at the conceptual level it would be
possible for ESB to impact the agent’s behaviour in different ways depending on
which behaviours are currently satisfied. To keep things simple, however, we choose
to restrict the effects of ESB behaviours to belief revision operations, as this provides
a clean interface to other (non-social) reasoning and does not interfere with the
procedural nature of such activities as deliberation and means-ends reasoning. Thus,
we only consider
add belief (ϕ) and del belief (ϕ)
as possible actions of a behaviour rule, where ϕ ∈ L . Note that while behaviour
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conditions allow temporal expressions over future expectation states to be taken into
consideration, actions only affect the current beliefs of the agent, i.e. any impact
of ESB reasoning on the agent’s overall state is instantaneous. Also, we are not
concerned with providing a semantics for these belief revision operations at the non-
ESB level, but simply assume that any sufficiently expressive reasoning framework
will have basic facilities for adding and removing beliefs whose semantics will be
well-defined (however, in a LORA context, what we specify does satisfy the
normal constraints on agent beliefs postulated by the logic).
With this, we can define the behaviours of an ESB reasoner as a set
BEH⊆
{
(φ ,a)|φ ∈LCTL,a ∈ {add belief (ψ),del belief (χ)},ψ,χ ∈L
}
of such condition-action pairs (φ ,a), and write φ B a when referring to such rules
to distinguish them from other types of rules.
The semantics of such behaviours, given an expectation set EXP and a strategy
STR is defined as follows, given a set of active expectations EXPA. If G = (V ,E )
is the expectation graph obtained from the set of all expectations EXP available in
principle, we define a slightly modified semantics for CTL entailment with respect
to EXP =℘(EXP) as state set and E as described by the expectation graph as
transition function (i.e. for all E,E ′ ∈℘(EXP) we write E → E ′ iff (E,E ′) ∈ E ).
DefiningM = (EXP,→) as a model in the CTL sense, the modification that has
to be performed is with regard to any rule that involves path operators or temporal
operators, e.g.
M ,E |= Aφ iff (∀E→ E1→ ·· · → En ∈ STR ∀i)M ,Ei |= φ
where the “∈ STR” restricts the set of paths to those specified by the strategy and
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is the only difference between this entailment rule and the standard corresponding
CTL rule. For the base case, we define:
M ,Ei |= φ iff φ =Φ(e) for some e ∈ Ei,φ ∈L
i.e. a formula φ ∈L is entailed in a particular expectation state Ei if it is equivalent
to one of the expected beliefs of that set. Adapting the other semantic rules for modal
operators is done by performing the same modification to each of the standard CTL
semantic rules that involves a statement about paths on the right-hand side.
Finally, we say that a behaviour φ B a is satisfied, if its precondition is entailed
by the current expectation state in the modelM , i.e. iff
M ,EXPC |= φ
where, as before, EXPC are those elements e ∈ EXPA whose condition C(e) is sat-
isfied. Note that this implies a difference between how the current expectation state
is treated, as opposed to future potential expectation states: Since the applicability
of conditions C(e′) for future states cannot be anticipated in the present state (they
don’t depend on expectation updates defined in EXP but on ESB-external events),
the validity of expectations in a (potentially temporal) formula φ must be interpreted
as “contingent” on the conditions. For example, if M ,{e,e′} |= E©Φ(e′′) holds,
this would mean that, given that {e,e′} are the current expectations whose conditions
C(e) and C(e′) are satisfied, then there exists at least one immediate successor (ex-
pectation) state, in which e′′ would be active. Whether or not e′′ would then become
a current expectation, however, would depend on the value of C(e′′) at the time.
As stated above, the connection to the non-ESB part of the reasoner is made
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through fairly high-level constraints on the beliefs of the agent: Let
BEHC = {(φ1,a1), . . . ,(φn,an)}
be the current behaviours, i.e. all behaviours satisfied in the above sense, then the
belief base of the agent (at the non-ESB level) will satisfy
(Bel A ψ1∧·· ·∧ψn)
and
¬(Bel A χ1∨·· ·∨χn)
where ai = (add belief (ψi),del belief (χi)).
4.4. Putting it all together
With these definitions, we can define an ESB reasoner as a tuple
R = 〈EXP,STR,BEH,B,E0〉
where given some set of current beliefs B⊆L (which we assume to be deductively
closed) and a set of initial expectations E0⊆EXPwe can view the operations defined
above as the specification of a belief revision function
(B,EXPA)
R−→ (B′,EXP′A)
that is based on conducting the following steps to determine the current expectation
given beliefs B and active expectations EXPA:
(1) Calculate the set of current expectations based on existing beliefs:
EXPC ={e ∈ EXPA | B |=L C(e)}
(2) Determine which behaviours are satisfied given current expectations:
BEHC ={(φ ,a) |M ,EXPC |=STR φ}
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(3) Compute new beliefs based on current beliefs and satisfied behaviours:
B′ = {ϕ | (φ ,a) ∈ BEHC,a = (add belief (ψ),del belief (χ)),
B\{χ}∪{ψ} |=L ϕ}
(4) Update set of active expectations:
EXP′A = update(EXPA,E
+,E−) where
E+ = {e ∈ EXPA|B′ |=L T(e)} and
E− = {e ∈ EXPA|B′ 6|=L T(e)}
For clarity, in this description we use subscripts |=L and |=STR to distinguish be-
tween propositional entailment in the language of ordinary beliefs L and CTL
entailment subject to the model restriction induced by STR, respectively. Steps (1)
and (2) result from checking expectation conditions and behaviour conditions. In
step 3., we re-build the (L−)deductive closure of the (non-ESB) belief base B based
on executing belief additions/deletions caused by those behaviours that fire. Finally,
in step 4., we use the update function as defined when we introduced the semantics
of expectations and calculate the sets of active expectations E+/E− whose tests have
succeeded/failed according to the contents of B.
At this level of specification, the above gives an abstract account of the overall
ESB reasoning cycle, which leaves a few details underspecified. Firstly, it is clear
that in any real implementation of ESB, the procedure for updating beliefs will not
be implemented as described in step 3. In most knowledge-based agent architectures,
deductive inferences are made on demand, and no explicit update of a deductively
closed set of formulae is ever performed. Any concrete implementation of ESB (such
as our ESB-RS system presented in the following section) will have to provide spe-
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cific implementation-level methods for dealing with these issues. Also, the definition
does not deal with the problem of potentially creating a conflicting knowledge base
which is a problem inherent to any design of any belief revision mechanism and ESB
does not claim to preempt.
Secondly, this model of ESB reasoning lacks a notion of time, in particular with
regard to the ways in which test outcomes are determined in practice. If we followed
step 4. exactly as described, an arbitrary number of consecutive ESB updates could
be performed without waiting for any opportunity for real belief updates from the
non-ESB part of the agent. In practice, implementations should perform a single such
step, and then hand control over to non-ESB reasoning components of the agent until
one or more new test outcomes become available, and thereby effectively suspend
the verification of B |=L T (e) statements for some period of time between each ESB
update. In the next section, we present a concrete implementation of a system that
realises exactly this functionality, the ESB reasoning system ESB-RS.
5. AN ESB REASONING ENGINE
Previously, we have claimed that the main benefit of ESB lies in its ability to
capture social reasoning mechanisms in such a way that they can be directly used by
agents for reasoning at run-time. To show how expectations, strategies and behaviour
rules can be used directly as executable specifications in a concrete agent design, we
now present the ESB Reasoning System ESB-RS.
ESB-RS is a fully implemented prototypical ESB interpreter based on algorithms
for model generation (to construct expectation graphs) and the NuSMV (Cimatti
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et al., 1999) model checking system (to check the preconditions of behaviours). As
ESB is not a standalone agent architecture, ESB-RS is designed for integration with
a specific BDI reasoning engine, in our case Jason (Bordini et al., 2007). Figure 1
illustrates the overall setup of an integrated ESB-RS+Jason agent, highlighting the
interactions between the ESB and BDI components of the system. These occur via
the BDI-level belief revision function (BRF), since expectations are updated based
on the agent’s perceptions and beliefs, and, conversely, the control of BDI-level
behaviour through ESB is exerted through beliefs which act as guards on plans to
carry out actions.
[Figure 1 about here.]
At a high level, ESB-RS execution can be described as follows:
Initialisation The expectation graph is generated from the expectation and strategy
specifications. This is only done once, as after this initial step the agent can simply
track the current expectation state in the graph during execution.
Reasoning cycle In each reasoning step, the beliefs from the BDI component, the
expectation graph and the strategy specification are used to create the reduced
strategy graph (i.e. the sub-graph accessible from the current state). The strategy
graph is then used by the behaviour condition checker to select the applicable
behaviour actions, which are used to update the agent’s BDI-level beliefs accord-
ingly.
In the following sections we describe ESB-RS at a more implementation-specific
level, detailing how the general principles of the formal model translate into a con-
crete computational design.
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5.1. Model generation
We have already described above how an expectation graph is built and how
it can be restricted based on a strategy specification. To be able to make use of
modern model checking technology, we need to map these operations to a concrete
“model generation” procedure. This procedure builds a finite-state machine (FSM)
representation of the expectation graph, which will then be used as a model (in the
model-checking sense) to verify behaviour’s preconditions. Importantly, we want to
construct the FSM model in the simplest possible way so as to obtain an executable
process model that satisfies the constraints set out by the ESB specification on which
it is based. With this regard, since ESB operates at the meta-reasoning level, it is suf-
ficient to encode the different “fields” (condition, test, responses) of an expectation
as variables controlled by state transitions in the FSM. More specifically, for every
expectation:
e.Condition ∈ {True,False,DC} : If e 6∈ EXPA, the value of its condition is DC
(“don’t care”). Else, e ∈ EXPC iff e.Condition= True.
e.Phi ∈ {True,False} : If e.Condition 6=DCwe have e.Phi= e.Condition,
else e.Phi= False (Φ(e) is not believed for non-active expectations).
e.Test ∈ {Tp,Tn,NA} – The outcome of a test is either positive (Tp) or negative
(Tn) or “not applicable” (NA). It is not-applicable whenever e.Condition= DC.
e.Tp.add, e.Tp.del and e.Tn.add, e.Tn.del: The add- and delete-sets for each
response of expectations are used to define the transition relation of the FSM, and
contain names of other expectation objects.
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The full model generation algorithm, originally described in (Wallace and Rovat-
sos, 2011), basically consists of pairwise checking of all expectations to determine
whether they are connected in the expectation graph G and in principle yields an
FSM structure that is isomorphic to G. However, the use of the model-checking
level of modelling here brings major advantages: Firstly, we don’t have to con-
sider all subsets of expectations and explicitly construct the powerset of EXP. It
is sufficient to capture the dynamics of how the state of an expectation could be
altered by any other expectation (e.g. “if e ∈ e′.Tn.del and e′.Test = Tn then
e.Condition = DC”) and how different elements of an expectation affect each
other (e.g. “if e.Condition 6= DC then e.Test ∈ {Tp,Tn}”). These impose con-
straints on possible system states (like e.Test ∈ {Tp,Tn}) which will automati-
cally be converted into multiple possible states whenever necessary by the model
checker. Secondly, given an initial state, the model checking system will automati-
cally only generate accessible portions of the expectation graph, so that the designer
does not have to care about mutually exclusive combinations of test outcomes or
contradictory responses of different expectations in the current expectation state.
5.2. ESB specifications in ESB-RS
To alleviate some of the practical issues surrounding writing purely propositional
expectation rules (such as potentially large sets of rules) ESB-RS provides some
additional syntactic sugar. By supporting variables in the various terms it allows
for writing more general expectations “templates”, covering a wide set of more
specific circumstances as instances of these templates. While not a full first-order
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extension, this still proves effective in greatly speeding up the task of writing sets of
expectations.
For implementation, supporting this is simple: it is done by grounding all pos-
sible variables when the condition C is checked and applying the resulting matches
to the same variables when Φ is added to the belief base, or the tests carried out.
As variables effectively represent shorthand for sets of expectations, there may be
multiple instantiations. If there is more than one valid variable binding for C, then Φ
is added to the belief base once for each binding. The tests are also considered for
each binding, exactly as if there were instead a set of ground expectations.
As an example, consider an agent that has an active expectation
(Exp N A trust(X) tradeWith(X) T ρ+ ρ−)
with beliefs (Bel A trust(alice)),(Bel A trust(bob)), the rule above means the expec-
tations include:
(Exp N A trust(alice) tradeWith(alice) T ρ+ ρ−)
(Exp N A trust(bob) tradeWith(bob) T ρ+ ρ−)
There is one instance of the expectation for each value of X .
5.3. Strategies
Strategies are implemented as a set of constraints on the transition relation, which
can be conditioned on either the edges (the tests that trigger transitions) or the states
(the expectations that define these). Each constraint is a Boolean next-expression
in NuSMV syntax which must be satisfied in all states in the strategy graph, so
that the expectation graph is reduced to those states satisfying these constraints. For
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constraints, we use the following syntax:
Constraint ::= expr→ next(expr) | next(expr)
expr ::= c = a | c ! = a | expr|expr | expr & expr | !expr
c ::= name | condition | phi | test | Tp.add | Tp.del | Tn.add | Tn.del
a ::= expectation | True | False | DC | Tp | Tn | NA
where
next(expr) refers to the value of expr in the next state.
expectation refers to the name given to an expectation tuple.
This means the transitions from a given state are constrained to those where the
next state meets all the strategy constraints (which may not just be constraints on
the current state, but also on the relation between the current and next state). The
atoms in the constraints are the conditions and tests of each expectation. These allow
restrictions on the states and transitions respectively, and can be combined using the
standard propositional logical operators.
For implementation, the specification of the FSM used for model checking be-
haviour conditions is split into a global main module and one sub-module per ex-
pectation. The main module controls the update for each sub-module and handles
carrying out the tests and thus effectively controls the changing sets of active expec-
tations. For example, a main-module constraint could be written as
next(Test != Tn)
to remove negative response transitions from the strategy graph, by requiring that
the Test of no successor state can return a negative test result. Note that for ease of
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implementation it is possible to specify that all tests must follow a certain form, or
to refer to specific expectations.
An example expectation sub-module constraint to ignore a particular expectation
(i.e. force the state to “don’t care”) could look as follows:
(name = Exp3) -> next(ExpC = DC)
This example states that if the name of an expectation is Exp3 then in successor
states the condition must be “don’t care” – the expectation is not active. This is
only one possible way the transition relation in the state transition model the model
checker uses could be specified by the strategies and was chosen for ease of imple-
mentation and to be minimally constraining.
The difference between main-module-level and sub-module specifications con-
straints used to specify a strategy is that the former concern test results (and thus
responses), whereas the latter modify the state of the condition of an expectation.
5.4. Behaviours
The language of behaviour conditions imposes limits on the power of an ESB
agent. The more complex the conditions that can be checked, the more complex the
forms of reasoning that can be captured. With this in mind, we aim to provide the
most general language for conditions within the constraints of the model checking
infrastructure used, to ensure fast, tractable reasoning while achieving maximum
expressiveness. Recalling that a behaviour is specified in terms of a condition and an
action, in ESB-RS, the action is simply a set of beliefs to add (or remove if present)
to the agent’s belief base. This can then be used however the designer sees fit by
practical reasoner plans. For example, it could act as the guard on a plan to request
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a joint action (this is exactly the case in one of the case studies presented in the next
section).
For implementation purposes the conditions are split into two parts: The CTL
component, which is a NuSMV syntax CTL condition to check, and a Jason condi-
tion, which is a Jason-syntax expression evaluated on the agent’s belief base. This
allows for behaviours to account for future reasoning (through the CTL condition)
and the current state of the agent’s belief base. So in the abstract case, for implemen-
tation a behaviour is split up as:
belief formula ∧ CTL formula B belief
This addition of a condition on the belief base to the condition on the expecta-
tions previously described serves principally to ease implementation and efficiency:
Instead of adding an action belief and then checking it in the practical reasoner,
the condition can include this check within it so that this (cheap) check can be
done before a (more expensive) model checking operation is performed. This does
not modify the general ESB functionality, but allows for more efficient runtime
behaviour.
6. CASE STUDIES
To evaluate the practical usefulness of the ESB framework, we have conducted
several case studies which deliberately focus on very different types of social rea-
soning: joint intentions in communication, reasoning about norms, and opponent
modelling. On the one hand, these methods are representative of classic coordination
mechanisms in multiagent systems research. On the other hand, they emphasise
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different aspects, such as hard-coded, simple and relatively static social conven-
tions (joint intentions), belief revision and choice over possible social behaviours
(norm-autonomous agents), and reasoning about others’ mental states in strategic or
adversarial domains (opponent modelling). Also, indirectly, our abstract trust and
reputation example above illustrates the application of ESB to a fourth category of
social reasoning, namely methods based on long-term observation of behaviour and
testimonies received from third parties (though this has not been taken to the level of
full implementation). This evaluation suggests coverage of a broad range of social
reasoning methods in which the ESB framework can be successfully applied. In the
following sections, we look at each of these case studies individually.
6.1. Joint intentions in communication
Joint Intentions (JI) (Cohen and Levesque, 1991) are one of the oldest coordi-
nation frameworks in multiagent systems research, and are based on extending the
notion of “intention” (as choice with commitment) to teams of collaborating agents.
Roughly speaking, the foundation of JI is the notion of a joint persistent goal (JPG)
– a joint mental state which requires that every agent is trying to achieve a joint goal,
and commits to notifying every other agent in the team when the goal either becomes
unachievable or has been achieved.
To re-implement JI-based reasoning and communication using ESB, we use the
description of the Request Conversation Protocol (RCP) for establishing a JPG by
Kumar et al Kumar et al. (2002), as shown in Figure 2 (with edges as communication
acts and nodes capturing the “social state”). Once agent X requests an action of Y , X
holds a so-called persistent weak achievement goal (PWAG) toward Y . The statement
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pwag(X ,Y,A,Q) denotes that agent X has a persistent goal to achieve A, if “relevance
condition” Q holds, and will have a persistent goal to notify Y that A is achieved, or
becomes impossible or irrelevant (i.e. ¬Q holds). If Y agrees, Y now also holds a
PWAG toward X to achieve the goal, which creates a JI (a JPG all participants are
aware of). X has a goal for Y to do some action, and Y has a goal to do this action
relative to X’s goal (we omit the case where X cancels the request).
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
Translating this to ESB, four expectations are needed to form and act on JIs in
the RCP from an agent’s point of view as shown in Table 1:
ExpJI If X holds a PWAG and Y holds a similar PWAG relative to it, the JI regarding
A is established. If A becomes true, or Q ceases to be present, or failure occurs
(indicated by a “fail” fact here), an ExpNotify expectation is raised which will
trigger notification of the other agent.
ExpReq If Y receives request(X ,Y,A,Q) from X , Y expects that X holds
pwag(X ,Y,A,Q).
ExpAgree If X receives agree(Y,X ,A,Q) from Y , X will also expect that Y expects
pwag(Y,X ,A, [Q∧ pwag(X ,Y,A,Q)]), given that this is a response to a previous
request message (for clarity, ExpReq captures an agent receiving a request).
This relevancy condition for Y ’s PWAG also includes that X still has the commit-
ment toward the goal, since it makes no sense for an agent to perform a requested
action if the requester is no longer committed to it.
ExpNotify Given that a JI exists this expectation will cause a belief must-Notify(X ,Y )
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to become true, which is supposed to block all plans at the BDI level except those
that cause a notification message to be sent to Y (this can be done by placing
guards on the respective plans).
This is an example of a very simple type of social reasoning, effectively based on
a conjunction of separate pwag(. . .) facts depending on the sequence of messages
exchanged. As can be seen from the expectations, hardly any tests and responses
are required, as the only dynamic belief concerns determining when notification of
the other agent is necessary. In fact, this ESB implementation of JI is particularly
“condition-heavy” in the sense that it makes very little use of tests (only T (ExpJI) is
non-trivial), and expected beliefs are simply switched “on” and “off” depending on
context conditions that capture most of the semantics here. Alternatively, one could
have opted for a “response-heavy” design where each expectation corresponds to a
state in the RCP diagram, and ExpJI expectations are explicitly added and removed
from EXPA depending on the situation. The choice of design here depends on what
part of the dynamics the user wants to make explicit for behaviour checking (as the
expectation graph is determined by tests and operations on EXPA). In our formali-
sation above, for example, one would not be able to make decisions contingent on
future communicative behaviour of X or Y , as the messages are not used as tests.
The reasoning agent could only anticipate different outcomes for A ∨ ¬Q ∨ fail.
Note that the ESB version of JI reconstructs the agent’s reasoning that follows
logically from the “mentalistic” semantics of the communication acts – whether
or not these are correct in the actual system depends on whether agents’ internal
reasoning mechanism implements them correctly.
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As regards strategies, in this simple set of expectations, there is no real need to
choose a constrained strategy, as the number of transitions in the expectation graph
is very small. We shall see cases in which strategies become more useful in more
complex examples below.
In terms of behaviours (condition B action pairs), only two behaviours are re-
quired for an agent to act upon joint intentions, that is:
ji(self ,Y,A,Q) B add belief (haveJI(Y,A,Q))
mustNotify(self ,Y,A,Q) Badd belief (triggerNotify(Y,A,Q))
i.e. the agent simply adds a corresponding belief at the BDI level, where the dif-
ferent names for beliefs (haveJI, triggerNotify) are only chosen to illustrate that at
the BDI level beliefs might be taken from a different language of primitives and
that behaviours act as an explicit interface between ESB and the general practical
reasoning level. What these belief revision operations effectively achieve would be
that a guard like haveJI(. . .) on all plans for joint action would ensure that no such
action is initiated without a joint intention having been previously formed. Similarly,
triggerNotify(. . .) would trigger an intention to notify the other agent of the required
fact. While this may seem a very obvious and simple case of social reasoning, it
shows how ESB can be used to make the reasoning pattern explicit and generate
actual social behaviour from a declarative specification of the mechanism in concrete
implementations.
Moreover, although the above is all that is strictly necessary to express joint
intentions, ESB provides an easy route to simply and generically query the social
reasoning mechanism. An example of this is determining when to request a joint
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action, and when to agree to one. We could postulate that we should request this if it
is possible in the future to hold a JI toward A, and it is desired:
(desire A)∧E♦(ji(self ,Y,A))Badd belief (requestJI(A))
The condition is similar for agreeing to a request, the only difference being the
requirement that a request has been received:
(desire A)∧request(self ,Y,A,Q)∧ E♦(ji(self ,Y,A)Badd belief (agreeJI(A))
While these behaviours might not seem to add much in our concrete set of expecta-
tions, they would help avoid engaging in RCPs if, for example, additional knowledge
was available about agents who will never agree to a request.
6.2. Norm-autonomous agents
The second case study we use to illustrate the broad applicability of our frame-
work is taken from the area of normative systems, which is usually concerned with
formulating and reasoning about system-level rules for agent behaviour to achieve
certain social objectives. Within this space, we deliberately choose the Normative
Agent architecture (NoA) (Kollingbaum, 2005) as an example of a framework which
relies less on strict regimentation of agent behaviour and allows agents to make deci-
sions about which norms to adhere to autonomously. This allows us to move from a
purely “socio-centric” social reasoning mechanism like Joint Intentions toward more
“agent-centric” frameworks, and thus to illustrate that ESB is also useful to capture
this kind of social reasoning.
NoA provides the usual concepts of obligations, permissions and prohibitions,
and uses these within the general practical reasoning cycle of the agent, operating on
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explicitly represented plans and goals. Thereby, it enables the agent to deliberate
over conflicting prohibitions and permissions, and to detect inconsistencies with
obligations. The architecture assumes that plans explicitly state their effects (so that
obligations can trigger plan selection, as obligations refer to states of affairs that
should be achieved), and it also makes use of explicit plan and goal representations
to be able to apply prohibitions selectively (e.g. when only certain instances of an
abstract plan need to be prohibited, NoA is able to derive appropriate constraints that
still permit application of the same plan for other instantiations).
Without going into too much detail on the general NoA architecture, we illustrate
its translation to ESB here using the blocks world example presented by Kolling-
baum (Kollingbaum, 2005, p. 69). The example features two norms for a block
moving robot:
obligation (
robot,
achieve clear(X),
not clear(X),
clear(X)
)
prohibition (
robot,
achieve on(X,"c"),
TRUE,
FALSE
)
The first of these states that robot is obliged to achieve the state clear(X) (this is
called the “action specification” in NoA). It becomes active if not clear(X), and
ceases to be relevant (“expires”) if clear(X). The second norm prohibits robot
from achieving on(X,"c") for a specific block c. This norm is always active and
never expires.
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In ESB, each norm corresponds to two expectations: a “norm expectation” to
handle the deontic content of the norm by asserting appropriate beliefs concerning
the action specification of the norm, and the “complement” which is needed to store
knowledge of the norm while it is not active so that it can be re-activated (this is not
needed for norms that never expire, like the prohibition above).
The expectations for the two norms above are shown in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
As regards the obligation, achieve(X) is the belief added when the OblClear(C) norm
is adopted, and clear(X) controls addition/removal of OblClear(X) and its com-
plement OblClearCompl(X). The prohibition, on the other hand, can be expressed
pretty trivially as it simply establishes a permanent social belief ¬allowed(on(X ,c)).
Note that the ESB style adopted for implementing this example is more “response-
heavy” than in our Joint Intentions example. In fact, OblClear(X) has no expectation
condition at all, and the only conditions we use are ¬relaxOC and ¬relaxPO to
represent domain-dependent situations in which the obligation/prohibition would be
relaxed (dropped) – they are simply placeholders in our example.
To translate these beliefs to BDI-level behaviour, we need a mapping from the
different types of action specifications provided by NoA into ESB, as shown in
Table 3. Apart from obligations, the norms translate to actual BDI plan selection
policies by means of a predicate allowed(. . .) which can be used as a guard on plan
selection rules (note that this predicate does not have a built-in semantics for ESB,
it is introduced as a special belief at the BDI level). For obligations, things are more
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complicated, as plan selection policies need to be modified – this is discussed in
more detail in the next section.
[Table 3 about here.]
6.2.1. Controlling permissions, prohibitions, and obligations. NoA uses explicit
representations of the effects of plans. Given that deliberation normally heavily
relies on plan selection, this is necessary as obligations, permissions and prohibitions
might refer to states of affairs (rather than to actions/plans directly), and an agent
needs to know what the effects of a plan would be before selecting it in order to be
able to check how that plan relates to existing norms. In the Blocks World domain,
an unstack plan, for example, could be described as follows:
plan unstack(X,Y)
precondition(on(X,Y)),
effects(ontable(X), not on(X,Y),clear(Y) )
(
achieve clear(X);
primitive doMove(X,Table);
)
This plan should only be selected if it is motivated by an obligation and the effects
are permitted by the norms according to some deliberation strategy. In ESB-RS, this
requires modification of plans at the BDI (in our case, Jason) level, to make the
effects explicit, so that the plan would look like this:
+!unstack(X,Y): block(X) & block(Y) & on(X,Y)
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& effects(unstack(X,Y))
<- !achieve(clear(X));
!move(X,table).
where:
effects(unstack(X,Y)):- effect(unstack(X,Y)) & effect(ontable(X))
& effect(clear(Y)) & effect(notA(on(X,Y))).
is the statement that makes the effects of the plan explicit, and ensures that the
plan itself, its actions, sub-goals, and post-conditions are admissible, based on the
following predicate:
effect(X) :- not ¬allowed(X)
| (¬allowed(X) & allowed(Y) & moreSpecific(Y,X))
| (¬allowed(X) & allowed(Z) & sameScope(Z,X)
& moreRecent(Z,X))
| (¬allowed(X) & allowed(W) & intersection(W,X)
& moreRecent(W,X)).
This (plan-independent, general) rule also enables the agent to deal with contra-
dictory allowed propositions regarding the same action/fact at different levels of
abstraction: it will make effect(X) true either if X is not explicitly disallowed
itself, or if (i) a more specific instance, (ii) a more recent and equally specific, or (iii)
a more recent, semantically overlapping instance of X is allowed, while X itself is
disallowed. For states of affairs, an explicit notA predicate is used. This is required
for implementation. The reason for this is that it is not required to check if P is in
the belief base (i.e. ¬P is true), but rather the predicate is used when matching effect
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specifications of plans. notA in a plan effect specification indicates explicitly that
not P is achieved as an effect.
The functions above to check the scope (moreSpecific, sameScope, in-
tersection) work by comparing the variables that are unified for the effects’
parameters. These are implemented as simple support plans in Jason that recurse over
the parameters of the effects statements being compared to determine the difference
in the sets of ground variables. For example, a more specific set of effects would
have more ground variables than a less specific one.
As before with the relaxOC and relaxPO facts, this just captures one possible
method of conflict resolution, and is only shown as an illustration of how the ESB-
RS implementation of NoA norms can be used by the BDI-level practical reasoner
to implement norm-autonomous behaviour (effectively specifying how the agent
chooses to interpret the norms at a local reasoning level).
To trigger plan selection, as a result of norms requiring the achievement of a goal
or the selection of a plan, two small extensions to the BDI reasoner are required.
Firstly, to select a particular plan it is simply adopted as an intention (and the above
mechanism ensures that plan is allowed). Secondly, if particular effects are required,
an internal action is triggered to select a plan based on the above effect information.
This process is described in more detail in Wallace (2010).
The fact that these interventions at the BDI reasoning level are required in ESB
mirrors the use of a “bespoke” BDI reasoner in the original NoA architecture, that
can reason explicitly about plan effects. While not strictly part of ESB, we include it
here to show that aspects of practical reasoning that are clearly non-social (such as
plan selection, in this case) cannot be dealt with by ESB in a straightforward way, at
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least not in combination with an off-the-shelf practical reasoning system like Jason
– wherever a social reasoning method affects general practical reasoning, system
implementation will have to cross the boundary between the two.
6.2.2. Translation from NoA to ESB. To summarise, we briefly recap the steps to
translate a NoA specification into ESB, given the additional generic ESB machinery
described above.
In a first step, plans are translated into plans in the Jason BDI component of ESB-
RS. Preconditions become guards, and the effects are specified as separate “effects”
predicates, as per the previous section. The actions in the NoA plan form the body
of the Jason plan.
Then, for each norm, the activation condition becomes the test of the complement
expectation (the condition is that the norm is not relaxed, and Φ is set to true). The
response to the test of this expectation is to add the norm-expectation. This has a
true condition, and the Φ term is as set out in Table 3 depending on the type of
norm. The deactivation condition of the norm becomes the test of this expectation,
and the responses swap the expectation for its complement.
The process of this translation from a NoA specification into ESB-RS is sum-
marised in Figure 3. Note that this translation algorithm presents a naive, generic
method of translation. As shown in the example above certain optimisations can be
performed where pairs of expectations can be contracted.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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6.2.3. Discussion. The sets of expectation structures and support plans described
above provide a general way to transform the key features of NoA specifications into
an ESB representation.
Although the method of implementation is different, the case study has shown
that the key properties of a complex social reasoning system can be preserved when
it is specified in ESB. The examples given here only come from a trivial Blocks
World scenario presented by Kollingbaum (Kollingbaum, 2005), but a more com-
plex “three-party Letter of Credit” protocol described in the same work was also
implemented. We were able to see that the ESB-NoA implementation behaved the
same in terms of norm activation and plans chosen (Wallace, 2010).
Considering the “practical vs. social reasoning divide” in the NoA implementa-
tion, more work is required on the practical reasoner side than would be desirable.
This is in part due to the inability to reason over expectation content. Assuming
that norms are captured with expectations and that the conflict resolution function
must act on these expectations, conflict detection at least must happen at the BDI
level as it cannot occur in strategies or behaviours. It is also not surprising that work
was required on the practical reasoning side as the NoA scheme is fairly close to
practical reasoning in its implementation – it represents a BDI extension to handle
social influences.
Not considered in the ESB-RS NoA implementation is the notion of adding new
norms previously unknown to the system. This would require an extension to the
current ESB implementation to allow for adoption of new expectations, but it is easy
to sketch how this might be done: When new expectations are added it would be
necessary to re-generate the FSM specification for the model checker and to run
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behaviour-condition style checks on the new expectations to ensure they caused no
problems.
A benefit brought to NoA from ESB-RS is that it situates NoA style normative
reasoning in an existing agent infrastructure (that of Jason). The NoA architecture
presented in (Kollingbaum, 2005) does not situate the reasoner in an agent infras-
tructure. Combined with the modularity shown in the ESB case studies this presents
a strong case for the argument that a framework for general purpose social reasoning
can ease implementation of such systems.
6.3. Opponent modelling in games
As an example of simple opponent modelling using ESB, we present a portion
of the reasoning rules for a Rummy (Rummy.com, 2008) playing agent (previously
introduced in (Wallace and Rovatsos, 2009)). Card games, particularly Rummy, can
provide a nice simple example domain as the strategies that the opponents might
use are known (for simple games) but depend on the cards they hold – which are
unknown. For the purposes of this example it is only important to understand that
players are trying to collect either runs of cards in a suit, e.g. {2♣,3♣,4♣}, or sets,
e.g. {2♣,2♦,2♥} (given a card X , other cards that could be part of a set/run with
that card are referred to as a “member of X’s sets/runs”).
The example involves only two players, where the ESB agent A reasons about its
opponent B picking up a 2♦. The example considers only relatively naive reasoning
on A’s part: that B will either be collecting a run of diamonds around 2, or a set
of 2s (A assumes B won’t hedge her bets by collecting cards for both a run and a
set). The expectations to enable this kind of reasoning are shown in Table 4. Note
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that the use of variables in ESB-RS specifications in Section 5.2 allows us to write
these rules at a more general level (e.g. for any card value rather than just for 2s in a
single set of expectations). For ease of readability, we have simplified the description
of expectations in places. For example, we say “member of a run” instead of a
disjunction of all the cards in that run. We keep the example specific to 2s here
to be able to show a relatively concise expectation graph below.
[Table 4 about here.]
Figure 4 shows the accessible expectation graph generated from the expectations
in Table 4 and initial state S2. Vertices are labelled with the expected belief Φ of
each expectation tuple, as this makes consideration of the relevant behaviours easier.
The initial state S2 is highlighted using double lines. Edges represent transitions
specified by the responses. A loop from a state indicates that the ρ+, ρ− responses
of some expectations do not cause a change in state. It is worth noting that this
example is different from the previous ones in that a lot more reasoning is encoded
in the responses, creating a richer graph.
[Figure 4 about here.]
A simple strategy that can be applied here is to consider the expectation graph
to a depth of one from the current state and to ignore loopbacks (shown by the bold
states in Figure 4, the strategy is applied assuming a current state of S5). This could
be appropriate, because responses are triggered by observations (which update the
status of tests) and these must come from observing cards played or picked up. Near
the end of the game, trying to predict actions too far ahead is meaningless. In terms
of implementation, this strategy would require slightly more control over strategy
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than that presented in this paper. Although it is possible to express a condition that
must hold in the next state in CTL (so check a depth of one) only adopting this
strategy at the end of the game implies an ability to change strategy according to
some beliefs of the agent (which would be influenced by expectations, if required). It
is easy to see how the single strategy approach could be extended to a set of strategies
preconditioned on agent beliefs, but this is not a functionality of the current ESB-
RS implementation. The strategy example still serves to illustrate the principle here,
however.
The richer nature of the graph hints at the benefits of being to be able to use more
complex CTL formulae to encode more sophisticated strategies. To give a game-
theory inspired example, consider an agent wishing to adopt a minimax strategy
for reasoning. Such a strategy would assume that the opponent will pick the worst
scoring option for the agent in each move, and so for its own move the agent will
attempt to maximise this minimum. To apply this concept to our running example,
we can model “moves”, which are the observed results of expectationT tests. The
ESB agent’s moves are not represented in the expectation graph for simplicity, but its
behaviour should maximise utility given worst-case play by the opponent. We restrict
the expectation graph by applying this principle before evaluating the preconditions
of behaviours. This requires making assumptions about the evaluation function the
opponent uses, which (to keep things simple) might look something like this:
• A pickup scores −1, as the opponent has gained a useful card.
• A discard scores +1 as the opponent has lost a card.
• Ignoring a card scores 0 as it tells us nothing.
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Based on this, the strategy is to build a tree of the graph to a certain maximum
depth, and then restrict it to only those paths which score lowest (adding the scores
down each path to gain a total at the leaves). The agent would then only consider
behaviours whose conditions apply in this minimax-restricted view of future possible
strategies.
Again, this is a hypothetical example to illustrate the potential of using ad-
vanced strategies in ESB, the ESB-RS implementation would need some extension
to support it. The model used to check behaviour conditions would need some small
changes to support restriction to a certain depth, namely adding a counter defined
to be incremented on subsequent states from the initial state. Similarly, it would
need a domain-specific extension to score certain expectations according to their
properties (as above) and use these scores to constrain the model as per the depth.
This is a limitation of ESB as currently envisaged, and, once more, is caused by
the limitation that reasoning over expectations is limited to the meta level and not
based on inference over expectation content. Ideally in this case we would score for
minimax based on the properties of an expectation, without requiring the domain-
specific knowledge of each expectation’s score.
7. RELATEDWORK
While the multiagent literature abounds in proposals for specific social reason-
ing mechanisms and frameworks, there are relatively few attempts to model social
reasoning as a general reasoning process allowing for enough generality to cover
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different approaches, and to support this model by a practical computational archi-
tecture.
Along these lines, the work that is probably most closely related to ESB is the
expectation-based framework introduced by Cranefield in (Cranefield, 2006, 2007)
and later refined in (Cranefield et al., 2011). Like ESB, the authors use the con-
cept of expectations to track dynamically changing beliefs about the environment.
They introduce a hybrid Metric Interval Temporal Logic hyMITL± to capture social
expectations such as norms and commitments in electronic institutions. The original
aim of this work was to build a monitoring tool using hyMITL± that could be used as
a compliance monitor based on the evolution of the system and observation of agent
behaviour. More recently, their concept of expectations as first-class constructs has
been further developed Cranefield et al. (2011), extending the formalism to capture
nesting of expectations and describing an approach to model-check the resulting
language.
As in ESB, no first-order concepts of specific social reasoning constructs like
commitments or norms are built into the logic. Instead, the logic is argued to be
capable of capturing the relevant properties that occur in many social reasoning
frameworks. Due to its focus on detecting violations of expectations, monitoring is
works by checking conditions that must be met at certain times, hence the focus on
time in the logic, which is not a focus in our formalism. The structure of expectations
in the hiMITL±-based approach is also similar to ESB. An expectation is held under
some condition and then monitored until it is fulfilled or violated according to some
other specification. In contrast to ESB, the social expectations in that work do not say
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anything about how expectations influence decision making and how the interaction
of an agent’s social and practical reasoning should be managed.
This work is extended to an implementation also utilising the Jason BDI engine
in Ranathunga et al. (2011). Superficially, this seems similar to work on ESB-RS.
Although the terminology is similar to that used here and in previous ESB papers,
the intent and construction of the system is different. Again the authors’ goal is
the monitoring of agent’s expectations with respect to norms. This is in contrast to
the ESB attempt to provide a generic framework to capture and implement social
reasoning schemes. Their approach to implementation also differs. They extend
Jason via the agent environment and additional internal actions for the reasoner,
to allow external plug-in expectation monitoring software. The agent reasoning is
still all part of the BDI plans and the interface from the external monitor is via
beliefs. This belief-based interface is similar to the approach in ESB-RS, however
here we present a split in the reasoning, with social reasoning separated from general
practical reasoning. This is central to our approach, and a key difference.
The definition of expectations used in the above work follows from that of Castel-
franchi in Castelfranchi (2005). These authors consider an expectation to be an
expected belief and a goal related to it. In ESB we talk about an expectation as being
the tuple containing the expected belief and the manner in which it affects other
expectations (the responses). This is because we view them as tightly interlinked
– expectations are closely related to other expectations and the overall dynamics
of the system. Castelfranchi also considers the dynamics of expectations, though in
terms of mental attitudes such as surprise and relief, relating to the actual outcome of
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expected beliefs. Instead, in ESB we are interested in how responses, which capture
expectation change, affect future social beliefs and actions.
Also mentioning expectations, though restricted to interaction protocols, is the
work of Alberti et al. Alberti et al. (2006). They present a tool that combines different
expectations to make inferences over sets of them. This would be complementary to
our ESB approach, but we focus on the interface to practical reasoning instead. It is
similar to ESB in that they talk about expectations in the light of events actually oc-
curring, but they do not link them to agent behaviour – specification and verification
is the focus.
Another approach that uses expectation-based modelling and reasoning is pre-
sented by Nickles et al. Nickles et al. (2004). While seemingly similar, however,
the “expectation networks” presented there are only loosely related to our concept
of expectations. Expectation networks focus on communication between agents,
and are used as a means to capture communication patterns probabilistically. On
top of the probabilistic model, occurrence of these patterns is subject to logical
conditions identifying certain social states of the system (or beliefs). The motivation
for this approach is that communication is necessary for agents to interact and so any
social relationships between agents can be described in terms of the communication
structures that emerge among them. Whilst this might be true, there are types of
agent reasoning that cannot be captured in this way, e.g. reasoning about mental
attitudes of other agents and inferred states of others, which requires revising beliefs
based on the observations of others’ behaviour as suggested by ESB. In this respect,
the work described in (Nickles et al., 2004) could be seen as a far more specific form
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of social reasoning concerned only with identification of observable communication
patterns and the prediction of future communication using on past experience.
Dennis et al. Dennis et al. (2008) propose to create an intermediate agent de-
scription language that can be used to capture different commonly used BDI pro-
gramming languages. The authors observe that there are many different BDI im-
plementations that share common constructs, and a common representation might
allow easier comparison between approaches and transfer of concepts. This goal
is certainly similar to that addressed by ESB, which tackles the same problem as
far as it concerns social reasoning, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. However,
the language Dennis et al. propose is intended to generalise over existing agent
programming languages – we suggest that ESB can be used to implement many
abstract social reasoning methods for which no practical computational framework
has been presented at all, and that it allows the combination of different such methods
in the same implementation.
At the intersection between social reasoning and general practical reasoning,
Dignum et al. have developed ideas similar to ours, albeit in a more specific manner.
Their B-DOING architecture (Dignum et al., 2000, 2002b,a) extends BDI to include
obligations and norms as motivations for an agent’s actions beyond the normal be-
liefs and desires of the BDI model. A logical system is presented to describe the
semantics of their approach and how these concepts may be captured and integrated
by way of preference orderings over goals. In contrast to the meta-level ESB reason-
ing, the object-level reasoning of B-DOING agents is based on the assumption that
these basic social motivations for action are sufficient to capture an agent’s social
concerns. A claim about how social reasoning should be done in the general case is
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implicit to this approach. Quite differently, we do not wish to promote any particular
style of reasoning, but propose a generic BDI-compatible social reasoning “plugin”
that allows many such styles.
The focus of their work is also more toward the logical representation of agent
reasoning than the computational concerns of ESB, which arise from our desire to
bridge the gap from theory to implementation.
Later work (van der Vecht et al., 2009) is more closely related to the ESB ap-
proach, as it focuses on more generalised decision making based on the influence
that events processed by the agent have on the agent’s practical reasoning cycle.
They propose an architecture for dynamically modifying the ways in which the
agent chooses to be influenced by others, i.e. the suggested method allows for meta-
reasoning about social influence, and thus aims at a similarly general level of social
reasoning as ESB does. Also, the suggested meta-reasoning can be used to determine
what type of reasoning and “how much of it” is appropriate in a particular situation.
This is similar to the goal of bounding social reasoning in ESB. However, while
the paper gives examples of a rule-based controller for this type of mechanism in a
particular domain, no general language and computational engine is given that could
aid designers in implementing agents with these capabilities more generally.
Sindlar et al. Sindlar et al. (2009, 2011) propose the use of abduction to infer
mental states of other agents given assumptions about their internal structure and
observations of agent behaviour in a BDI context. The underlying idea of tracking an
agent’s assumptions about hidden properties of the system based on observations is
similar to the basic idea behind expectations in ESB, however the authors apply this
idea in a much more specific way: Their focus is exclusively on BDI agents (as the
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agents that are being modelled, not the modelling agent herself), and on producing
explanations for observed behaviour, whereas ESB focuses on bounding reasoning
(through strategies) and on social decision making and acting (through behaviours).
Thus, abduction-style reasoning to infer mental states could be something that might
be implemented in ESB, but there are many other instances of ESB that could be
very different in style.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a computational framework for practical social
reasoning based on making the update mechanisms regarding social beliefs explicit,
by connecting them to observations. Our framework allows for defining how sets of
such belief-observation-update rules, which we call expectations, are reasoned over,
taking into account the reasoning resources available to the agent, by specifying
strategies that define the set of future expectation states considered when making
inferences. Furthermore, it specifies how decision making and actual behaviour gen-
eration can be influenced at a general practical reasoning level by using behaviours
that are conditioned on properties regarding current and future expectations.
The ESB framework makes the following contributions: From an analysis point
of view, we introduce the conceptual machinery necessary to capture practical social
reasoning mechanisms at the desired level of generality, i.e. using abstractions of
expectations, strategies, and behaviours as metaphors for structuring social reason-
ing process. These abstractions allow for an analysis of existing social reasoning
mechanisms.
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We claim that our conceptual framework is general enough to cover most ex-
isting social reasoning abstractions, but specific enough to allow us to focus on the
computational processes that are specific to social reasoning. This also allows for a
direct comparison of different social reasoning methods using our framework.
From an engineering point of view, we present a formal model and specifi-
cation language that allows designers to write declarative specifications of social
reasoning rules like those presented in the examples above in a modular, extensible,
and domain-independent way. This language supports designers in implementing
socially intelligent agents by allowing them to formulate the “theory” of a given
social reasoning mechanism in a uniform language. Moreover, following a declar-
ative paradigm enables the reuse of specifications, and eases the task of combining
different specifications.
The central contribution from an implementation point of view is the “trans-
duction” of these specifications to executable process models. We have shown that
such deductive synthesis can be achieved within the limits of ESB, and that sim-
ple algorithms can be used to prune the models generated from a specification to
avoid unnecessary complexity (Wallace and Rovatsos, 2009). Using model checking
methods, we obtain a high degree of expressiveness in terms of behaviour checking,
and we illustrate how an ESB reasoning engine can be seamlessly integrated with
BDI-style agent programming languages.
Overall, the significance of our contribution lies in enabling agent designers
to implement a broad range of (combinations of) social reasoning methods in a
uniform, generic framework without having to “embed” the behavioural properties
that should follow from the method in the general practical reasoning mechanism
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of the agent in an implicit way. Instead, they are provided with the “social reason-
ing middleware” that can be directly coupled to the remaining agent program, and
provides an additional level of abstraction. This, in turn, is expected to simplify
the implementation of such social reasoning algorithms, which is still the exception
rather than the rule. And, in theory, it should have similar benefits as the introduction
of generic practical reasoning schemes such as BDI: The abstractions provided by
BDI, desires, plans, intentions, goals, commitments, intention reconsideration, belief
revision, etc. enabled a standardisation that provided an additional, generic layer
for modelling architectures that previously were largely developed in an ad hoc,
incomparable fashion. In the long term, we would hope that something similar can
be achieved by ESB and other such social reasoning frameworks.
In the future, we would like to develop more practical and usable tools for ESB
so that more large-scale, complex specifications of social reasoning mechanisms can
be tested, and we can learn more about and thus improve the process of engineering
the social reasoning layer of multiagent systems in real-world applications.
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FIGURE 1. Conceptual Overview of an ESB-RS Agent
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PWAG(X,Y,A,Q) JI(X,Y,A,Q)
JI 
Complete
JI 
Failed
JI 
Failed
REQUEST(X,Y,A,Q) AGREE(Y,X,A,Q)
REFUSE(Y,X,A)
∨ CANCEL(X,Y,A)
INFORM(Y,X,NOT DONE A)
INFORM(Y,X,DONE A)
∨ CANCEL(X,Y,A)
FIGURE 2. The Request Conversation Protocol (adapted from Kumar et al. (2002))
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Require: NoAP, Set of NoA plans
Require: NoAN , Set of NoA norms
Ensure: BDIP, Set of BDI plans and rules that capture NoAP
Ensure: EXPN , Set of ESB-RS expectation capturing NoAN
for all P ∈ NoAP do
Create a BDI plan P′ ∈ BDIP
Name(P′) = Name(P)
Precondition(P′) = precondition(P) & effects(Name(P′))
Body(P′) = Body(P)
Create a rule effects(Name(P′))
effects(Name(P′)) = effect(E1) & effect(E2). . . & effect(notA(N1) &
effect(notA(N2). . .
Where E1,E2 . . .EN are achieved by effects(P)
N1,N2 . . .NN are explicitly not achieved by effects(P)
end for
for all N ∈ NoAN do
Create an expectation E1N ∈ EXPN
C(E1N) = true
Φ(E1N) = ActivationCondition(N), mapped as per Table 3
T (E1N) = ExpirationCondition(N)
ρ+(E1N) = add( {E2N}), del({E1N})
ρ−(E1N) is empty
Create an expectation E2N ∈ EXPN
C(E2N) ¬relax, where this is a belief specific to relaxing this norm.
Φ(E2N) = true
T (E2N) = ActivationCondition(N)
ρ+(E2N) = add( {E1N}), del({E2N})
ρ−(E2N) is empty
end for
FIGURE 3. Pseudocode describing a translation from a NoA specification into ESB-
RS.
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T(E1),T(E3),T(E4)
T(E2),T(E5)
T(E2),T(E5)
¬T(E1),T(E2),T(E5)
¬T(E5)
¬T(E2)
T(E1),¬T(E2),¬T(E5)
¬T(E5)
¬T(E3),¬T(E4)
¬T(E1)
¬T(E2)
¬T(E3),¬T(E4)
T(E4),¬T(E4)
T(E3),T(E4)
Φ(E2): Collecting a ♢ run
Φ(E5):Collecting a ♢ run 
Φ(E1):Collecting 2s
Φ(E3):Not collecting 2 set
Φ(E4):Not collecting set or run
Φ(E2): Collecting a ♢ run
Φ(E4):Not collecting set or run
Φ(E5):Collecting a ♢ run Φ(E3):Not collecting 2 setΦ(E4):Not collecting set or runΦ(E1):Collecting 2sΦ(E2): Collecting a ♢ runΦ(E5):Collecting a ♢ run 12 34 5
FIGURE 4. Accessible Expectation Graph, showing the states reachable from the
initial state S2. Bold states represent states accessible with a simple depth-1 strategy
from state S5.
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TABLE 1. JI Expectations. All are in the initial set EXPA of both agents. X,Y are both variables, but the
example in the text assumes X requests a JI with Y.
ExpJI(A,Q) ExpAgree(A,Q)
C
pwag(X ,Y,A,Q) ∧ agree(Y,X ,A,Q) ∧
pwag(Y,X ,A, pwag(X ,Y,A,Q)
[Q∧pwag(X ,Y,A,Q)])
Φ ji(X ,Y,A,Q) pwag(Y,X ,A,
[Q∧pwag(X ,Y,A,Q)])
T A∨¬Q∨ fail false
ρ+ add(ExpNotify(X ,Y,A,Q)) -
ρ− del(ExpNotify(X ,Y,A,Q)) -
e ExpReq(A,Q) ExpNotify(A,Q)
C
request(X ,Y,A,Q) ji(X ,Y,A,Q)
Φ pwag(X ,Y,A,Q) mustNotify(X ,Y )
T false false
ρ+ - -
ρ− - -
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TABLE 2. Obligation-to-Clear and Prohibition-On expectations in the blocks’ world example
OblClear(X) OblClearCompl(X) ProhibitionOn(X)
C true ¬relaxOC ¬relaxPO
Φ achieve(clear(X)) true ¬allowed(on(X ,c))
T clear(X) ¬clear(X) false
ρ+ add(OblClearCompl(X)), add(OblClear(X)), -
del(OblClear(X)) del(OblClearCompl(X))
ρ− - - -
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TABLE 3. Translation of Action Specifications into ESB Representation. S represents a state of affairs, P
a plan (or single action). Duals for negative cases (e.g. prohibit(¬perform(P)) for obligation(perform(P))) are
omitted for brevity.
Norm ESB Φ belief
permission(achieve(S)) allowed(S)
prohibition(achieve(S)) ¬allowed(S)
obligation(achieve(S)) achieve(S), select a plan with allowed(S) in its effects
permission(perform(P)) allowed(P)
prohibition(perform(P)) ¬allowed(P)
obligation(perform(P)) select plan P
A FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTICAL SOCIAL REASONING 67
TABLE 4. Expectations in the Rummy example: the labels of initial expectations (1,2,5) are shown in bold
face; tests are broken down into +(. . .) and −(. . .) events that would confirm/disappoint the expectation
N C Φ T ρ+ ρ−
1 B picked
up 2♦
B
collecting
2s
B picks up an avail-
able 2 and has dis-
carded none
remove({2,5})
add({3,4})
remove({1})
2 B picked
up 2♦
B
collecting
♦ run
B picks up member
of 2♦ run and has
discarded none
remove({1,3,4})
add({5})
remove({2,5})
add({3,4})
3 B dis-
carded
2♣
B not col-
lecting 2s
B ignores a 2 - remove({1,3})
add({2,5})
4 B
ignored
a 2
B not after
2s for run
or set
B ignores a 2 - remove({1,3})
add({2,5})
5 B picked
up 3♦
B
collecting
♦ run
B picks up another
member of 3♦ run
and has discarded
none
remove({1,3,4})
add({2})
remove({2,5})
add({1,3,4})
